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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
GUS CHOURNOS and 
VEVE CHOURNOS, 
Plaintiffs 
and Appellants, 
v. CASE NO. 17363 
NICK D'AGNILLO, et ux., 
Defendants 
and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action to establish a right-of-way by 
prescription in favor of plaintiff and against adjacent 
landowner defendants. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the court. From a Judgment 
for the defendants, denying plaintiffs' claim of right-
of-way by prescription, quieting title of defendants as 
against all claims of plaintiffs, and denying plaintiffs' 
motion for a new trial, plaintiffs have appealed. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek affirmation of the Judgment of the 
District Court in their favor. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants' Statement of Facts fails to state the 
facts presented to and relied upon by the trial court 
in its finding of judgment in favor of respondents. The 
facts as determined and relied upon by the trial court 
are as follows: Appellants and respondents are adjacent 
property owners of property located in Riverdale, Weber 
County, Utah, fronting on the northerly right-of-way line 
of Riverdale Road. (Exhibits 4P, SP, 6P) Both properties 
were essentially used for farming until 1946, at which 
time Riverdale Road and the viaduct over the railroad 
tracks and the Weber River were completed. (T 72) There-
after, the use of the properties in the area gradually 
changed into commercial use. 
Respondents acquired their property from the parents 
of Nick D'Agnillo, who had purchased the property from 
Hendrieka Becker in December of 1939. The Warranty Deed 
of conveyance described the whole 7.4 acres of land, 
excepting a right-of-way over the easterly fourteen feet, 
as reserved in a Deed dated August 23, 1911. (Exhibit 6PI 
Respondents have continually used the property, including 
the east fourteen feet subject to the right-of-way, from 
1939 to the present for agricultural purposes. (T75, 75, 
78, 79, 81, 82, 86, 99, 144, 162) Respondents utilized, 
2 
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with other deeded owners, the east fourteen foot right-of-
way portion of their deeded property as an access to their 
other farm land lying to the south of Riverdale Road, which 
road was constructed about seven years after respondent, 
Nick D'Agnillo's father and mother had acquired the property. 
(T71) At least three other property owners and the power 
company held deeded rights to utilize the easterly fourteen 
foot right-of-way over respondents' property to gain access 
to their farm properties lying to the south of Riverdale 
Road and to service power linen. (Tl7, 18, 37, 40, 71, 72, 
102, 103, 104, 118, 129, 139) A fence constructed of 
wooden posts and barbed wire separated appellants' and 
respondents' properties along appellants' west property 
line. (T73, 130) Sometime near 1946, the southerly 
portion of this fence fell down from disrepair, so that no 
fence existed on the i:Joundary line between the properties of the 
parties, until a new fence was constructed by respondents 
in April of 1977. (TS, 11, 95, 107, 108, 130, 131) 
However, an irrigation ditch approximately three feet in 
width separated the two properties along the southerly 
portion of the boundary line of the old fallen fence; 
some time near 1946, the southerly portion of this open 
irrigation ditch was piped by using old hot water tanks 
with the tops and bottoms removed, placed end to end, and 
covered over with a few inches of dirt. (Tl2, 24, 25, 73, 
74) Light vehicles could cross this covered ditch area 
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along the boundary line, but it would not support heavier 
vehicles. (T24) Approximately fourteen feet to the west 
of the boundary line of the parties, respondents maintained 
a barbed wire fence to enclose their farm equipment and 
calves in the pasture to the west of the fence. (T41, 77, 
BO, 104) In 1961, three telephone or electric light 
utility poles, thirty to forty feet in length, were placed 
along the southerly ninety feet, moreorless, of the boundar;' 
line of the properties, lying end to end a few feet to the 
west of the covered portion of the irrigation ditch. (T77, 
78, 103, 104, 133, 145, 146, 162, 163) These utility poles 
remained for three or more years, and they constituted a 
ground barrier which prevented motor vehicle travel from 
appellants' property across the east fourteen feet of 
respondents' property to gain access to Riverdale Road. 
(T78, 106, 134, 163) 
In March of 1977, appellants commenced construction 
of a drive-in window on the west side of their 
building. (Tl07) The trial judge inspected the 
properties of the parties at the commencement of the trial, 
and in the facts stated in his Memorandum Decision 
found that an out-cropping window was constructed on the 
west side of respondents' building which was the proper 
height to be used as a service window for sales to per~M 
inside automobiles; the court termed it as a "take-out 
window". · · 6 ( T2 3, 4 • 5 • 6 l (M·.~morandum Decision ,page ; , 
4 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In March of 1977, respondents' son, John D'Agnillo, had 
a conversation with appellant, Gus Chournos, in which 
Chournos informed John D'Agnillo that he was con-
structing a drive-in window, and that he intended to 
utilize the easterly portion of respondents' property 
for the access lane to Riverdale Road. John D'Agnillo 
informed Chournos that he could not make such use of 
his father's property. (T 107, 108) In April of 1977, 
respondents constructed a steel post barbed wire fence 
along the old boundary line between the parties, where 
the original fence had fallen down years before. (T' 108) 
In September of 1978, appellants filed the within action 
claiming a right-of-way by prescription over the east 
fourteen feetof respondents' property adjacent and to 
the west of appellants' building and drive-in window, for 
use as an ingess and egress lane of travel onto River-
dale Road. 
Prior to 1946, appellants' property was owned by the 
Childs family, who made no claim either by deed or use 
of any portion of respondents' property which is the 
subject of this dispute. (Tl3, 14) In 1946, the Childs 
conveyed the premises to Jesse M. Stephens, and it was 
Stephens who enclosed the southerly portion of the old 
irrigation ditch utilizing the old hot water tanks. 
(Tl2, 24, 25) At this time the old boundary line fence 
5 
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between the properties had fallen down. (T8, 11, 95) 
Stephens constructed the first building upon appellants 
premises around 1946, which building he utilized as a 
blacksmith shop. The original building was located 
approximately twenty nine feet east of his west property 
line, and there were some doors on the west side thereof 
for vehicles to enter and egress. (T .9) Any use by 
Stephens or his customers of any portion of respondents' 
property was rare. (TlO, 75) In 1951, Stephens sold 
the property to Myrtle Cornish, formerly Myrtle Warner. 
(T24) 
Mrs. Cornish and her former husband, Mr. Warner, 
remodeled the building and then leased it to a series 
of successive tenants from 1951 through 1969, in which 
year they sold the property to appellants. (T 27) The 
first such tenant was an auction-liquidation house, 
occupying the premises for about one year. (T27, 31) 
In 1952, the second tenant, a Jim Knight, leased the 
premises for about three years and used it as a beer 
tavern or private liquor club; his customers did not 
drive vehicles across respondents' property in the 
area in which appellant claimed a prescriptive ease-
ment. (T 27, 31, 35) Thereafter, a Ray Nelson leased 
the premises and operated it as a beer tavern, but his 
customers did not drive across respondents' property 
now the subject of this dispute. (T 32) From 1961 
6 
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through 1964, a Ray Hansen and his son, Bill Hansen, 
leased the property as a beer tavern, but their cus-
tomers did not drive across the disputed area. (T 35, 
36) Appellants first entered into possession of the 
property in 1964, under a five year lease from Mrs. 
Cornish, which extended until 1969,when appellants 
purchased the property from Mrs. Cornish. (T 27, 45, 
46) Appellants operated the property as a beer tavern, 
and after adding a kitchen to the building in 1970, 
they thereafter operated the premises as a restaurant 
and a beer tavern. (T 50) Appellant, Gus Chournos, 
testified that his customers and delivery people drove 
across and parked motor vehicles in the area in dispute 
from 1964 through 1969. (T 49, 52, 53, 55, 56) Re-
spondents' witnesses, Nick D'Agnillo, John D'Agnillo, 
Willis J. Mitchell, Joseph D'Agnillo, and William K. 
Taylor testified to the effect that the customers of 
appellants and the prior lessees extending from April, 
1977, back twenty years to 1957, did not drive motor 
vehicles across,nor did they park motor vehicles in 
the area in dispute, as claimed by appellants. (TR 78, 
105, 116, 130, 131, 132, 135, 136, 137, 143, 154, 157, 
163, 165, 171, 175, 176) 
Appellants' and respondents' evidence was presented 
to the court on May 21, 1980, and after respondents' 
7 
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counsel rested their case, attorney for appellants stat~ 
to the court, "That's all I have. I have no rebuttal, 
your Honor. May I just ask Mr. Chournos here just one 
question. That's all, I promise." (T 182) Thereafter, 
counsel asked Mr. Chournos one other question, and then 
he stated, "I have nothing further .... " (T 182) 
The case was thereafter set for argument six days later 
on May 27, 1980. Prior to entering the courtroom for 
the presentation of arguments, the trial Judge, in 
chambers, asked the respective counsel if either had 
further evidence to present, and each counsel replied 
that he did not. counsel thereupon entered the courtroom 
and presented their closing arguments, and the 
court stated to counsel that he would read their res-
pective trial briefs and give his decision to his sec-
retary. (T 184) At no time during the trial did 
appellants' counsel inform the court or respondents 
that Mr. Ray Hansen was going to appear as a witness, 
but that he became ill. At no time between May 21, 
1980, when the evidence was presented, and May 27, 1980, 
d dJ_. d appellants' when the closing arguments were presente , 
counsel claim that he had any further evidence to present 
by any witness, nor did he inform the trial court or 
1 h M H Or any Other witness respondents' counse tat r. ansen 
f · 1 on June 11. was ill on May 21, 1980, at the time o tria · 
8 
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1980, twelve days after the entry of the trial court's 
Memorandum Decision in favor of appellants,is the first 
time that counsel for appellants notified the trial court 
and respondents' counsel that he desired to present to 
the court the testimony of Mr. Ray Hansen, who he stated 
was ill on May 21, 1980. This information was presented 
in appellants' Motion for a New Trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANTS FAILED TO PROVE BY CLEAR 
AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE A PRESCRIPTIVE 
RIGHT-OF-WAY ACROSS RESPONDENTS' PROPERTY 
Utah case law clearly recognizes the doctrine of 
"right-of-way by prescription", and the Utah Supreme 
Court has declared that such a right-of-way may be 
established by open, notorious, continuous, adverse use 
against the owner of the subservient property for a term 
of twenty years. Zolinger v. Frank, 75 P2 714,(1946 ). 
In the Zolinger case, Justice Wolfe defines the meaning 
of "adverse use" and states that the adverse use means 
a use that must be against the subservient owner as 
distinguished from under the owner. 
In the case of Jensen v. Gerrard, et al., 39 P2 1070, 
(1935), at page 1072 of the opinion, Justice Hanson 
stated: 
9 
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"The burden was upon them to establish such 
claim by clear and satisfactory evidence." 
Thereafter, in Buckley v. Cox, et al, 247 P2 277 
(1952), the court cited Jensen v. Gerrard, supra, and 
further clarified the burden of proof of a claimant of 
a prescriptive easement wherein Justice McDonough de-
clared at pages 279 and 280 of the opinion: 
"Furthermore, since the defendants claimed the 
right to use the driveway by prescription, they 
have the burden of establishing such claim by 
clear and convincing evidence." 
Continuing on at page 80, the court said: 
"It was defendant's burden to overcome this 
presumption and to establish his claim by 
clear and convincing evidence. Jensen v. Gerrard, 
supra. This, in the judgment of the lower court, 
he failed to do." 
Morris v. Blunt, et al., 161 P. 1127, (1916) is a 
frequently cited Utah case on the law of prescriptive 
easements. This case is authority for the well recog-
nized rule that the adverse use must be continuous, 
without interruption, for the prescriptive period of 
twenty one years. The rule is stated in the following 
language at page 1131 of the opinion: 
"Under the well-established rule, the use, in 
order that it may ripen into a prescriptive 
title, must, in any case, not only be adverse 
and continuous, and under claim of right for 
a period of twenty years, but it must be 
uninterrupted throughout that period." 
The necessity of an uninterrupted adverse use for 
a full twenty year period was again emphasized by the 
Utah Supreme Court in the more recent case of Thompson 
v. Griffiths, 344 P2 983, (1959) wherein Justice Wade, 
10 
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at page 985, stated: 
"Suffice it to say that there was sufficient 
evidence from which the trier of the facts 
could reasonably find that at no time was 
there a full twenty-year period when the use 
by the owner of the dominent estate was 
adverse and uninterrupted." 
Another rule of law in regard to the establishment 
of prescriptive easements, that has relevant application 
in this action, is the rule enunciated in Nielson v. 
Sandberg, 141 P2 696 (1943) to the effect that the claimant 
of the prescriptive easement must show that he has acquired 
it by his own use. Respondents acknowledge that such a use 
would allow a claimant tacking onto any periods of use through his 
predecessors in title during any uninterrupted twenty-year 
period. At page 700 of the opinion, the rules was stated 
as follows: 
"A party claiming the right must show that he 
has acquired it by his own use, independent of 
others; he cannot make his right depend in any 
degree upon the enjoyment of a similar right 
by others. (citations)" 
The above principal of law was more recently cited 
by Judge Maughan in Richards v. Pines Ranch, Inc., 
559 P2 948 (1977) at page 950 of the opinion. 
Respondents have no quarrel with the case law cited 
in appellants'brief if applied in accordance with the facts 
as found by the trial court in this case. It is the duty 
and prerogative of this court to review both law and fact 
and to consider the weight and sufficiency of the evidence. 
Respondents are entitled to the benefit of the well established 
11 
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rule that the facts as found by the trial court, as a trier 
of the facts, will be reviewed in the light most favorable 
to the prevailing party, and that the Findings of Fact will 
not be disturbed unless they are shown to be manifestly 
erroneous, as to demonstrate oversight, or mistake mat-
erially affecting the rights of appellants. Richins v. 
Struhs, 412 P2 314 (1966). The facts as set forth in 
respondents' Statement of Facts are supported by the 
evidence in the transcript and should be viewed from the 
point of advantage of the trial court because of its 
proxirni ty to the parties, the witnesses, its examination of 
the site, and its observation of the trial. 
An application of the recited rules of law to the 
facts established during the trial, supported by the cited 
record, and as stated in the court's Memorandum Decision 
and Findings of Fact, clearly demonstrates that a right-of· 
way by prescription against Respondents' property has not 
been established by appellants. In April, 1977, respondent 
re-established a barrier along the old fence line between 
the properties by their construction of the steel post and 
barbed wire fence which thereafter blocked access to any 
portion of respondents' property by vehicular traffic fi~ 
appellants' property. Looking backwards twenty consecuti'·' 
years from April 1977, through April 1958, there was a two 
year period of interruption of use in 196], and 1962. Thi: 
12 
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interruption of use was caused by the telephone utility 
poles placed on the ground, end-to-end, along the old 
fence line, which blocked any possibility of vehicular 
use across respondents' property by appellants' pre-
decessor Hansen, who leased and operated the property 
from 1961 until 1964. Regardless of any other acts of 
adverse use which appellants claim to have established, 
such use was not continuous,but was interrupted for a 
two year period in 1961 and 1962. The evidence clearly 
establishes that the boundary line fence between the 
properties fell into disrepair in 1946, and there was 
no evidence of any adverse use by appellants and their 
predecessors prior to that year. Looking forward from 
1946 through a twenty year term, ending in 1966, the 
required twenty year restrictive use term was interrupted 
for a period of two years, in 1961 and 1962. The trial 
court, in fact, found that the evidence did not establish 
that there had ever been any open and notorious use by 
appellants and their predecessors in interest under any 
claim of right over and across respondents' property; 
there had been occasional intrusions of vehicles into 
the area that would constitute trespass. The trial court 
found and the evidence supports the fact that there was 
no open notorious claim of right to the use of respondents' 
adjacent property as a vehicle parking lot. 
The two year period of interruption of any claimed 
use, in 1961 and 1962, would shorten the last claimed use 
13 
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period ending in 1977, to fifteen years. There is no 
evidence of any claim of use by appellants' predecessors 
in title prior to 1946. Prior to 1946, the old wood 
and barbed wire fence constituted a barrier between the 
two properties, and the construction of Riverdale Road 
to which the ingress and egress right-of-way is claimed, 
was not completed until 1946. (T 72, 155) Appellants 
cannot base their claim of use upon the use of land 
owners who possessed deeded right-of-ways across the east 
fourteen feet of respondents' property. The case of 
Nielson v. Sandberg, supra, enunciates the rule that t~ 
claiming party must show that it has acquired its claim 
by its own use, independent of others. 
Appellants have made no reference in their brief of 
any evidence that would in any way indicate the trial cour'. 
was guilty of an abuse of its discretion in determining the 
facts, nor in making application of the law. This court rna:' 
review the facts in the light of the evidence as believed 
by the trial court, and not necessarily as urged upon the 
court from the point of view of the appellants. Kier v. 
Condrack, 478 P2 327 (1970). One of the long established 
rules in regard to the basis upon which an appellate court 
views the findings of fact of a trial court is: That be· 
cause of the advantageous position of the trial court with 
its first-hand observation of the testimony and derneanM~ 
the witnesses, the appellate court will view the trial 
court's findings with considerable indulgence, and su~ 
· b unless the evi'dence prepon~r~~ findings will not e upset 
14 tr 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
against them, or the trial court has mistaken or mis-
applied the law applicable to them. Pagano v Walker, 
539 P2 452, 454. (1975) 
An examination of the relevant testimony of all of 
the witnesses as set forth in the transcript and the 
other evidence before the court, including its physical 
observation of the premises during the trial, clearly 
establishes that appellants failed to carry their burden 
of proof by the clear and convincing evidence required. 
The facts presented at the trial simply did not support 
the requirements of law for the establishment of a pre-
scriptive right-of-way across respondents' property 
through twenty years of open, notorious, continuous, 
adverse use. 
POINT II 
APPELLANTS'MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL, 
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO REOPEN 
THE TRIAL TO RECEIVE ADDITIONAL 
TESTIMONY WAS PROPERLY DENIED BY 
THE TRIAL COURT 
Under Rule 59(a) (3)of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
in an action tried without jury, the trial court may grant 
a new trial, open the judgment, take additional testimony, 
or amend the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, or 
make new Findings and Conclusions of Law by reason of 
accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have 
guarded against. 
15 
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• 
In the case of Jensen v. Thomas, 570 P
2 
695, (1977), 
which was a personal injury action wherein the plaintiff 
claimed surprise by the testimony of a physician, but 
plaintiff made no timely objection on the basis of surprise 
the court in commenting upon the application of Rule 59 (ai' 
stated at Page 696 as follows: 
"A ruling on a motion for a new trial will not be 
disturbed on appeal except when there is a clear 
abuse of the Court's discretion. We do not believe 
the Court abused its discretion in denying that 
motion on the basis of Rule 59 (a) (3), as that Rule 
speaks about surprise 'which ordinary prudence could 
not have guarded against.' On the contrary, the 
surprise could, we believe, have been guarded 
against." 
Thereafter, in Anderson v. Bradley, 590 P 2 339, (1979), 
at Page 341 of the Opinion this Court again emphasized that 
surprise as a ground for a new trial is only that which 
ordinary prudence could have guarded against. 
It is submitted that in this action there was nosurpr~ 
Appellants made no objection or claim of surprise at the 
time of trial or six days later at the time of argument. ro: 
witnesses testified on behalf of respondents of the exislffi' 
of the utility poles lying on the ground asn an obstructior. 
along the boundary line in 1961, and 1962, when a RayHan5' 
leased the premises now owned by appellants. (T 77, 78,!0l, 
104, 133, 145, 146, 162, 163) Appellants made no claim of 
surprise or objection to any of the cited testimony. 
ndentl 
Prior to the trial appellants' counsel informed res!Xl 
16 
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counsel that, "I might use Mr. Hansen." at the trial as 
a witness. (T 183) At no time during the proceeding was 
Mr. Hansen called as a witness, nor was he subpoenaed as such. 
At the time respondents rested their case on May 21, 1980, 
appellants' stated: 
"That's all I have. I have no rebuttal, your 
Honor." (T 182) 
No mention of Mr. Hansen as a witness, and no claim of 
surprise by any testimony presented at the trial, was made 
between the day of trial on May 21, 1980, and the day of 
final argument on May 27, 1980. In chambers, prior to the 
presentation of the final arguments, the trial judge asked 
if either counsel had further evidence to present to the 
Court prior to arguemnts; both counsel stated that they 
did not have further evidence, and they thereafter entered 
the courtroom and presented their closing arguments. 
It was not until after the court had issued its 
Memorandum Decision on May 30, 1980 and its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Judgment, on June 10, 1980, 
that appellants thereafter filed their Motion for a new 
trial on June 11, 1980. It was in apPellants'motion for a 
new trial that the first mention of Mr. Hansen as a witness 
or of Mr. Hansen being ill was reported to the Court or to 
respondents' counsel. It was in the motion for a new trial 
that appellants' counsel first made any mention of surprise. 
It is submitted that there was in fact no surprise, and if 
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there had been any surprise, it could have easily been 
guarded against by a timely objection to the court and by 
furnishing information to the Court and respondents• counse: 
about the claimed illness of Mr. Ray Hansen. Appellants 
did not take the oral depositions of any of respondents' 
witnesses prior to the trial. 
In the interest of economy and justice, each trial must 
come to a timely conclusion. Counsel have the duty and 
responsibility to determine on behalf of their clients, 
during the trial procedings, when they shall elect to conck 
the presentation of evidence and rest their case. Attorney' 
are not granted the privilege and luxury of waiting until 
after the case has been argued, taken under advisement, and 
ruled upon by the Court, to then elect to present the origimi 
testimony of just one more witness. The time for such a 
decision has long since passed. 
Ordinary prudence could have guarded against any such 
claimed surprise, by the proper utilization of the rules o: 
discovery, by timely objection to the claimed surprise 
evidence, or by a request for continuance because of the 
illness of a necessary witness. None of these actions were 
taken by appellants. It was within the discretion of the 
trial court and in the interest of justice that appellants 
motion for a new trial or in the alternative to reopen the 
trial proceeding, was denied. 
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POINT III 
RESPONDENTS DO HAVE RECORDED TITLE 
TO THE RIGHT OF WAY CLAIMED BY APPELLANTS 
Appellants' claim of right of way against respondents 
property is based solely upon a prescriptive use. Appellants 
make no claim of title by deed or any other source to any 
part of respondents' property. The status of the quality 
of respondents' title to the property conveyed to them 
through the recorded instruments in their chain of title 
is wholly immaterial to appellants' claims as tried by the 
court. 
In the deeds of conveyance to respondents through their 
predecessors, the various deeds, after describing the whole 
7.4acres of property to be conveyed contained the following 
clause: "Excepting, a right of way 14 feet wide, the center 
line o-f which is described as follows: (metes and bounds 
description of center line set forth) . . . as the same is 
described and excepted in deed recorded August 23, 1911 in 
Book 67 of deeds at Page 78". Words of exception and reserva-
tion have been used so indiscriminately in reference to 
easements and rights of way that they may be treated as 
synonymous in meaning, and the legal intent is to be detennined 
not by the word used but by the purport indicated in the 
entire grant. In discussing the use of words of exception 
and reservation, it is stated in Thompson on Real Property, 
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Sec. 3090, VOL. 6 Page 777, as follows: 
"In order to determine whether a reservation or 
an exception has been made, the court must look 
to the substance of the right exepted or reserved 
and make an independent determination, regardless ' 
of whether the right is termed an exception or a 
reservation in the instrument .... 
It is often difficult to distinguish between 
an exception and a reservation in a deed, and the 
words, 'reserving' and 'excepting' are not conclusive 
in determining which is intended. The character 
and effect of the provision in which such words 
occur must determine what is intended." 
The Conclusions stated in the trial court's Memorandum 
Decision dated May 3, 1980 properly ruled that the deed oi 
conveyance to respondents transferred a fee simple title 
subject to a right of way. The court relied upon the princifa: 
that the law abhors small strips of land which are never 
conveyed, and attaches them to properties which are conveyec 
The testimony presented at trial discloses that at all time: 
subsequent to the deed of conveyance to the D' Agnillo farnil 
in December, 1939 ,that they have continually used all of the 
premises for agricultural purposes, subject only to the 
use of the fourteen foot right of way along the easterly 
portion thereof by those persons who held deeded interests 
therein. 
Respondents again emphasize the fact that the quality 
1 · f respondents' ti' tle is wholll' or status of marketabi ity o 
by appellants in this act~n, immaterial to the claims made 
which is a claim based solely upon prescriptive use. 
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CONCLUSION 
The appellants failed to present to the trial court 
clear and convincing evidence of a right of way by prescrip-
tive use against the respondents. The trial court properly 
exercised its broad discretion in refusing to grant appellants 
a new trial or to reopen the case for the purpose of receiving 
additional testimony. The judgment of the trial court should 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KUNZ, KUNZ & HADLEY 
BY:~~~~~~+-'-1....4."""""T-L T. KUNZ 
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